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Abstract
In the last decade, the ease of online payment has opened up many new oppor-
tunities for e-commerce, lowering the geographical boundaries for retail. While
e-commerce is still gaining popularity, it is also the playground of fraudsters who
try to misuse the transparency of online purchases and the transfer of credit card
records. This paper proposes APATE, a novel approach to detect fraudulent
credit card transactions conducted in online stores. Our approach combines (1)
intrinsic features derived from the characteristics of incoming transactions and the
customer spending history using the fundamentals of RFM (Recency - Frequency
- Monetary); and (2) network-based features by exploiting the network of credit
card holders and merchants and deriving a time-dependent suspiciousness score
for each network object. Our results show that both intrinsic and network-based
features are two strongly intertwined sides of the same picture. The combination
of these two types of features leads to the best performing models which reach
AUC-scores higher than 0.98.
∗Corresponding author. Address: Km. 1 Camino a Los Niches, 3344158 Curico´, Chile. Phone:
+56 75 220 1756
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1. Introduction
In recent years, e-commerce has gained a lot in popularity mainly due to the
ease of cross-border purchases and online credit card transactions. Customers are
no longer bound by the offers and conditions of local retailers, but can choose
between a multitude of retailers all over the world and are able to compare
their products, offered quality, price, services, etc. in just a few clicks. While
e-commerce is already a mature business with many players, security for online
payment lags behind. Recently, the European Central Bank (ECB) reported that
the value of card fraud increased in 2012 by 14.8% compared to the year before
(ECB, 2014). The main reason is the strong growth in online sales, resulting in
many ”card-not-present” transactions (CNP), a means of payment that catches
the attention of illicit people who try to mislead the system by pretending to be
someone else. As a consequence, credit card issuers need an automated system
that prevents the pursue of an incoming transaction if that transaction is highly
sensitive to fraud, i.e. the transaction does not correspond to normal customer
behavior.
This work focuses on automatically detecting online fraudulent transactions.
Data mining offers a plethora of techniques to find patterns in data, distinguishing
normal from suspicious transactions. A key challenge in fraud is to appropriately
deal with the atypical character of fraud. That is, there are many legitimate
transactions and only few evidence of fraudulent transactions to learn from, which
complicates the detection process. Carefully thinking about and creating signif-
icant characteristics that are able to capture irregular behavior, is an essential
step in an efficient fraud detection process. In this paper, we combine both in-
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Figure 1: Toy example of a credit card fraud network. Weights depict the recency of the
transaction between the merchant and credit card holder.
trinsic and network-related features. Intrinsic features analyze the transaction as
if it is an isolated entity, and compare whether the transaction fits in the nor-
mal customer profile. We create those features by deriving RFM attributes –
Recency, Frequency and Monetary Value – of the credit card holder’s past trans-
actions. Network-based features, on the other hand, characterize each transaction
by creating and analyzing a network consisting of credit card holders and mer-
chants which are related by means of transactions. A sample network is given in
Figure 1.
We use a collective inference algorithm to spread fraudulent influence through
the network by using a limited set of confirmed fraudulent transactions and decide
upon the suspiciousness of each network object by deriving an exposure score –
i.e. the extent to which the transaction, the associated account holder and the
3
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merchant are exposed to past fraudulent influences.
In this work, we will answer the following questions: (1) Is a new incoming
transaction in line with normal customer behavior, i.e. does it correspond to reg-
ular spending patterns of that customer in terms of (a) frequency or the average
number of transactions over a certain time window (b) recency or the average
time in between the current and previous transaction and (c) monetary value or
the amount spent on that transaction? (2) Which merchants, credit cards and
transactions are sensitive to fraud? Given past network-based information be-
tween merchants and credit card holders through the transactions made, how do
we derive a suspiciousness score for (a) merchants indicating which merchants are
often related to fraud, and as a consequence, form a risk of pursuing future fraud-
ulent transactions; (b) credit card holders who act irregularly or whose credit
card is stolen and (c) transactions by combining evidence of the associated credit
card holder and merchant; (3) Does our detection approach which combines both
intrinsic and network-based features, significantly boost the performance over tra-
ditional intrinsic-only models, and if so, which specific set of features contribute
in detecting efficiently fraud?
We propose APATE (short for: Anomaly Prevention using Advanced Trans-
action Exploration), a novel, automated and real-time approach to tackle credit
card transaction fraud by mapping past purchasing patterns and customer behav-
ior into meaningful features and compare those features with the characteristics
of a new, incoming transaction. We apply supervised data mining techniques to
uncover fraudulent patterns from a real-life credit card transaction data set ob-
tained from a large credit card issuer in Belgium. Our approach complies with
the six-seconds rule, i.e. within six seconds the APATE algorithm needs to de-
cide whether the transaction should or should not be pursued. We contribute by
4
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
proposing a new propagation algorithm to propagate fraud from the network edges
(i.e., the transactions) towards all the network components (i.e., the credit card
holders and merchants) and derive for each transaction network-based features.
Those features are combined with a set of intrinsic features to feed the learning
algorithms. Our fraud detection model is able to dynamically adapt to a changing
environment and continues to operate under the condition that fraudsters invent
new ways to perpetrate their illegal activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce the credit
card fraud domain in Section 2. Section 3 discusses the proposed methodol-
ogy, and focuses on intrinsic and network-based feature extraction (Sections 3.1
and 3.2). In Section 4, we summarize the results. Section 5 concludes this paper.
2. Credit Card Transaction Fraud
2.1. Background
Credit card fraud detection is a widely studied research domain. Bhatla et al.
(2003) and Delamaire et al. (2009) distinguishes between various types of fraud
like application fraud (i.e., acquiring a credit card with false information), stolen
or lost card, counterfeit card (i.e., card copying or using a card which does not
belong to the owner) and card-not-present (CNP) fraud (i.e., using credit card
details to make distance purchases). Our paper focuses on CNP fraud perpetrated
through online credit card transactions.
As manually processing credit card transactions is a time-consuming and
resource-demanding task, credit card issuers search for high-performing and ef-
ficient algorithms that automatically look for anomalies in the set of incoming
transactions. Data mining is a well-known and often suitable solution to big data
problems involving risk such as credit risk modelling (Baesens et al., 2003), churn
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prediction (Verbeke et al., 2011) and survival analysis (Backiel et al., 2014). Nev-
ertheless, fraud detection in general is an atypical prediction task which requires
a tailored approach to address and predict future fraud. We say that fraud is
an uncommon, well-considered, imperceptibly concealed, time-evolving and often
carefully organized crime which appears in many types and forms:
• Uncommon The number of legitimate transactions outnumbers the num-
ber of fraudulent transactions drastically. Many credit card fraud detection
studies report a fraud ratio of less than 0.5% (Brause et al., 1999; Shen
et al., 2007; Sa´nchez et al., 2009; Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Duman and
Elikucuk, 2013; Bahnsen et al., 2013, 2014; Dal Pozzolo et al., 2014).
• Well-considered Once fraudsters find a way to swindle, they exploit it
until that type of fraud is discovered and prevention actions are taken. Ex-
tracting the right features and minimizing the opportunities of fraudsters
to perpetrate fraud without being caught is an essential step in the fraud
detection process.
• Imperceptibly concealed Fraudulent transactions often exhibit the same
characteristics as legitimate transactions. Maes et al. (2002) formulated
this as the presence of overlapping data. While many studies solely focus on
customer profiling – intra-account equivalence, i.e. the extent to which the
current behavior differs from previous customer behavior – models should
take advantage of the knowledge sprouted from previous accounts used by
fraudsters and compare this with currently legitimate customer – inter-
account equivalence, i.e. the extent to which the customer profile differs
from fraudulent profiles.
• Time-evolving An efficient fraud detection process is dynamic. There are
two reasons. First, fraudsters change their way of working. Models should
6
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Figure 2: Credit Card Detection Process
be fed with the most recent data to capture new types of fraud, and at the
same time, should be able to prevent “existing” fraud. Second, customer
changes in lifestyle might affect the spending patterns. Models that contrast
a new transaction against the customer’s transaction history mark changes
in spending patterns as suspiciously.
• Carefully organized Once a credit card is stolen, it is used in many fraud-
ulent transactions. Analogously, certain merchants are more sensitive to
fraud – merchants that perpetrate fraud by themselves or that are easily
accessible by fraudsters. Efficient detection models need to exploit the re-
lational structure among credit card holders and merchants.
Each of the aforementioned requirements need to be addressed before a de-
tection model can efficiently work in practice. In the remainder of the paper, we
formulate a solution that systematically incorporates all of these requirements.
2.2. Credit Card Fraud Detection Process
The credit card detection process is summarized in Figure 2. The ultimate
goal of such detection processes is to prevent the pursue of all transactions that
do not comply with the imposed regularities. When a new transaction arrives in
the system, a series of acceptance checks is performed. The transaction processing
system checks for example whether the user entered the right PIN or whether the
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spending amount is yet sufficient. If the transaction clears the acceptance checks,
it is passed on to the sanity check of the detection system. Here, the system
computes the probability that the transaction is fraudulent, e.g. by applying
a detection model learned from past transactions. If the probability exceeds a
certain threshold, the transaction does not proceed and is aborted. The sanity
check has both an on-line (i.e., in real time) and off-line module. The data set
under consideration consists of all processed transactions by Worldline Belgium.
A transaction is fraudulent if the transaction does not pass the (a) on-line or (b)
the off-line sanity check, or (c) by customer notification. While (a) is known in
real-time, (b) and (c) can take up to one week.
The on-line detection process is liable to the “six-seconds rule” of decision.
This means that both the acceptance check and the on-line sanity check need to
be processed within six seconds. Our approach discusses the sanity check, and
can be implemented both in an on-line as an off-line environment.
2.3. Related Work
Although fraud detection in the credit card industry is a much-discussed topic
which receives a lot of attention, the number of publicly available works is rather
limited. One of the reasons is that credit card issuers protect the sharing of data
sources and most algorithms are produced in-house concealing the model’s details.
In particular, credit card fraud detection techniques can be divided into two broad
categories: supervised and unsupervised methods. Unsupervised methods solely
use the customer (or transaction) characteristics to group them into small, similar
clusters while maximizing the difference between the extracted clusters. If a new
transaction of a certain customer is not allocated to the normal customer group,
then an alarm is raised for that transaction (Bolton et al., 2001). Unsupervised
techniques include peer group analysis (Bolton et al., 2001; Weston et al., 2008)
and self-organizing maps (Zaslavsky and Strizhak, 2006; Quah and Sriganesh,
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2008). More studies focus on supervised techniques using evidence of past fraud-
ulent transactions to infer the suspiciousness of future transactions. The most
prevalent technique for supervised credit card fraud detection is artificial neural
networks (ANN’s) (Ghosh and Reilly, 1994; Aleskerov et al., 1997; Dorronsoro
et al., 1997; Brause et al., 1999; Maes et al., 2002; Syeda et al., 2002; Shen et al.,
2007). While ANN’s generally achieve a high performance, they are black box
models which lack interpretability. Recently, the use of ensemble methods like
random forests is found to perform well in credit card fraud (Whitrow et al.,
2009; Bhattacharyya et al., 2011; Dal Pozzolo et al., 2014). Random forests work
especially well when there are many input features to learn from, which is often
the case in network-related classification problems (Henderson et al., 2011). Other
techniques for supervised learning in fraud are meta-learning (Chan et al., 1999),
case-based reasoning (Wheeler and Aitken, 2000), Bayesian belief networks (Maes
et al., 2002), decision trees (Shen et al., 2007), logistic regression (Shen et al., 2007;
Bhattacharyya et al., 2011), hidden Markov models (Srivastava et al., 2008), asso-
ciation rules (Sa´nchez et al., 2009), support vector machines (Bhattacharyya et al.,
2011), Bayes minimum risk (Bahnsen et al., 2013, 2014) and genetic algorithms
(Duman and Elikucuk, 2013).
The aforementioned models do not exploit the relational structures. To the
best of the authors’ knowledge, APATE is the first to include network knowledge
in the detection models.
3. Proposed Methodology
In this section, we discuss how the APATE detection process is implemented.
Note that the detection process comprises the sanity check as illustrated in Fig-
ure 2. Particularly, we start from a list of time stamped, labeled transactions and
learn a model to infer future fraudulent transactions. As fraud detection models
should adapt dynamically to a changing environment, we introduce a sliding time
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Figure 3: APATE ’s re-estimation process of the detection models using a sliding window.
window which characterizes a transaction based on current (i.e., short term), and
normal (i.e., medium and long term) customer’s past behavior. Both intrinsic
and network-based features are derived using those three time windows. Since
model estimation often cannot be executed within six seconds, we choose to daily
re-estimate the detection models at midnight the day before. Transactions made
during the next day are evaluated using the model trained on data of the day be-
fore. The transaction features are extracted at real-time and fed into the model.
This is depicted in Figure 3.
The APATE fraud detection process consists of two featurization steps:
1. Intrinsic feature extraction How does the incoming transaction differ
from the previous transactions performed by that credit card holder?
2. Network-based feature extraction APATE exploits the relationships
between credit card holders and merchants by means of transactions. The
set of network-related features measures the exposure of each network object
to fraud.
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Table 1: Summary of input features on short (ST), medium (MT) and long (LT) term.
Summary statistics
Variable Description ST MT LT
µ σ µ σ µ σ
Transaction features1
Location (dummy) Issuing region
Belgium 0.16 0.37
EU 0.76 0.43
MC Category (dummy) Category sensitivity to fraud
Low 0.67 0.47
Medium 0.31 0.47
Amount Amount of transaction 78.7 202.9
Recency Time passed since last transaction
MC at the merchant 8.95 13.01 235.69 417.62 2483.8 2887.5
MC Category at the merchant category 8.97 13.04 232.9 415.2 2652.03 2988.6
Global across all transactions 10.31 14.39 318.3 455.8 2996.4 3011.0
Country in the same country 9.29 13.63 242.6 420.1 2582.0 2950.7
Currency with the same currency 9.99 14.13 292.9 446.4 2957.6 3034.2
Frequency Total number of transactions
MC at the merchant 0.12 0.70 0.25 1.54 0.85 5.85
MC Category at the merchant category 0.13 0.74 0.28 1.63 0.92 6.11
Global across all transactions 0.23 1.53 0.52 2.62 1.82 9.99
Country in the same country 0.17 0.98 0.37 2.09 1.27 9.48
Currency with the same currency 0.19 1.04 0.42 2.18 1.52 9.79
Monetary Value Average amount of transactions
MC at the merchant 5.24 120.84 9.64 158.21 30.08 558.6
MC Category at the merchant category 6.54 139.09 13.39 198.45 47.05 783.66
Global across all transactions 18.49 259.54 60.1 1083.7 288.63 7041.3
Country in the same country 11.56 199.12 43.26 1002.4 227.67 6619.9
Currency with the same currency 13.57 220.06 50.45 1068.8 261.9 7033.4
Event occurrence First purchase?
MC at the merchant 0.93 0.24 0.89 0.30 0.80 0.40
MC Category at the merchant category 0.93 0.26 0.89 0.32 0.78 0.41
Global across all transactions 0.89 0.31 0.80 0.40 0.52 0.50
Country in the same country 0.91 0.29 0.86 0.35 0.72 0.45
Currency with the same currency 0.90 0.30 0.83 0.38 0.60 0.49
Average Transactions Average per time frame and level
Global across all transactions 78.5 181.09
Merchant at the same merchant 78.3 199.26
Exposure Score Extent to which transaction (TXN),
merchant (MC) and credit card
holder (CCH) are influenced by fraud
given the network.
Transaction (TXN) 0.11e-2 0.018 0.46e-3 0.45e-2 0.40e-4 0.29e-3
Merchant (MC) 0.063 0.500 0.092 0.390 0.141 0.259
Credit card holder (CCH) 0.26e-4 0.85e-2 0.34e-4 0.36e-2 0.27e-4 0.76e-3
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All features are summarized in Table 1. In the remainder of this section, we
will discuss in more details how we extracted each of the features to include in
our APATE models.
3.1. Intrinsic Feature Extraction
Traditionally, attempting to predict fraud using supervised data mining has
been supported by the characterization of the purchase patterns that the cus-
tomers present previous to the fraud event (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011). Most
models are constructed using an aggregation of the transactions and their value.
(Krivko, 2010) uses both the number of transactions and the monetary value of
them to estimate rolling windows that are then used to train the model, Whitrow
et al. (2009) use several aggregation techniques on the data and study the effects
of the aggregation on the results, and Jha et al. (2012) construct a detailed data
set that contains several transaction aggregations, plus information on the country
in which the transaction occurred, to name a few. The literature seems to agree
that there are three conditions that assist in predicting fraud: the transaction
details, the time framework, and the location in which they occur.
Following this, the first set of variables that we propose for studying this prob-
lem are a mixture of literature variables, plus some other indicators that arose
during our research, and it refers to the characteristics of the transactions them-
selves. We start by constructing variables inspired by the transaction analysis,
including all variables that we were able to replicate from the studies in the litera-
ture. Our variables include the number of transactions that occur in a given time
framework (frequency), the amount of money spent in those transactions (mon-
etary value), and the time between two subsequent transactions in a particular
time period if any (recency).
1Independent of time window
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These variables fit within the Recency - Frequency - Monetary Value (RFM)
framework, which is widely used in marketing (Blattberg et al., 2008). There
is no agreement in the literature regarding which one is an appropriate time
framework to estimate these variables, ranging from hourly to averages over three
months, so we propose to study both the short, the medium and the long term:
the last hour of transactions (attempting to capture cards that are heavily used
and then dropped), the last day of transactions (attempting to capture specific,
consumption-prone days), and the last week of transactions (attempting to cap-
ture the normal behavior of the customer). As will be shown in the experimental
part (Section 4), we have one month of transactions available, so analysis of longer
time periods were not possible. Jha et al. (2012) suggests that useful information
can be extracted regarding the merchant at which the purchases occur. Data
that is available, and that will be used to aggregate the merchants, concerns the
merchant itself, a gross category in which the spending occurs (i.e. supermar-
kets, clothing stores, etc.), and an aggregated global variable with all merchants.
The literature (e.g. Bhattacharyya et al. (2011)) seems to suggest that perform-
ing the RFM analysis segmented by the currency and the country in which the
transactions occurred would also bring information relevant to the study.
An additional set of binary variables was created to mark for when no purchase
has occurred. These variables (FirstPurchase) mark if the transaction is the first
one in that measured time frame, for each of the dimensions that are measured (see
Table 1). This information is relevant mostly to a generalized linear model such
as logistic regression, as discussed in Allison (2001). We construct 15 variables
accounting for each level of aggregation and time period.
In summary, using three time periods, three types of RFM variables, and five
types of transaction aggregations (single merchant, category, country, currency
and global), we develop a set of 60 (3 × 3 × 5 + 3 × 5) variables aggregating
the past transactions. All variables have the following naming scheme: Level
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of Aggregation, RFM Type, Time Period. So for example, GlobalRecencyHour
refers to the Recency (time between consecutive purchases) within one hour, when
considering all available merchants.
The second step is to characterize the transaction itself using the location
in which it occurred and the merchant info. Given the characteristics of the
European credit card users, there is a strong pattern of credit card use European
Union-wide, rather than in the country where the card is emitted. Transactions
that occur outside the EU (mostly in the US) are rarer. We include dummy
variables for these three zones (EU, Belgium, and Rest-of-World, ROW) to capture
this information. Table 2 shows relevant information supporting this segmentation
for the data set available for this work.
Table 2: Transactions per Region and Fraud Percentage
Region % of Transactions % Fraudulent
Belgium 16,13% 0,05%
European Union 75,39% 0,45%
ROW 8,48% 5,36%
Total 100% 0,78%
We completed this part of the data set with the variables from the literature
that do not fit the RFM framework. There were some variables from the literature
which could not be implemented in our study, given the availability of data: some
works in the literature use three months of data (Bhattacharyya et al., 2011), but
we only have one month available so it was impossible. We also have available
only online transactions of one issuer, so bank-related and POS related variables
are not applicable, such as in Sa´nchez et al. (2009) and Whitrow et al. (2009).
We included dummy variables representing the currency in which the transaction
occurred, categorizing them in euros, US dollars, and other currencies. We also
included variables regarding the average amount of the transactions during the
14
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last week, as suggested by Bhattacharyya et al. (2011) and Whitrow et al. (2009),
which were estimated both at global transaction level and at merchant level.
The last set of constructed variables deal with the categories of merchants. The
data provider manifested that there were suspicions that fraudulent transactions
tended to accumulate in certain categories. Using this information, the available
categories (19) were segmented into three large categories using the individual
categories’ fraud percentage. This leads to three dummy variables (CategoryLow,
CategoryMid, and CategoryHigh) capturing this assumption.
After constructing the data set along the intrinsic (transaction related) vari-
ables, we complement the information by exploring a novel approach of network
analysis, as described in the next subsection.
3.2. Network Feature Extraction
3.2.1. Network definition
Complex network analysis (CNA) studies the structure, characteristics and
dynamics of networks that are irregular, complex and dynamically evolving in
time (Boccaletti et al., 2006). Those networks often consist of millions of closely
interconnected units. Most real-life networks are complex. CNA uses graph theory
to extract useful statistics from the network. Boccaletti et al. (2006) define graph
theory as the natural framework for the exact mathematical treatment of complex
networks, and consequently, they formalize a complex network as a graph. A
graph G = (V, E) consists of a set of vertices or nodes v ∈ V which are connected
to each other by a set of edges or links e ∈ E . Graphs can be directed or undirected,
depending on whether the edges impose a direction or an order in the network.
When edges express the intensity of relationships between nodes, we say that the
graph Gw = (V, E) is weighted.
Mathematically, a graph can be represented by an adjacency matrix An×n =
(ai,j) with n the number of vertices in the network. The adjacency matrix is
15
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an n × n matrix, and ai,j = 1 if a link between node i and j exists, ai,j = 0
otherwise. A weighted matrix Wn×n = (wi,j) is the matrix representation of a
weighted graph and wi,j ∈ ]0, 1] expresses the intensity between node i and j if a
link exists, or wi,j = 0 otherwise.
A graph that represents heterogeneous node types, is a multipartite graph. In
particular, the credit card fraud network in this work is represented as a bipartite
graph G = (V1,V2, E), containing two node types – i.e. credit card holders and
merchants – and satisfies the following property:
e(v1, v2) subset of V1 × V2 (1)
with v1 ∈ V1 the set of credit card holder nodes, and v2 ∈ V2 the set of
merchant nodes. Property 1 enforces that a transaction can only exist between
different node types, i.e. credit card holders and merchants. A toy example of
the credit card network is shown in Figure 1.
The corresponding adjacency matrix Ac×m = (ai,j) of a bipartite graph is a
matrix of size c × m with c and m the total number of credit card holder and
merchant nodes respectively. The weight matrix Wc×m = (wi,j) represents the
weighted graph as a matrix.
In order to address the dynamic character of fraud, we integrate time into the
network such that the edges express the recency of the transaction. Inspired by
the half-life decay of atoms, we exponentially decay the intensity of a relationship
in time, where:


wi,j = e
−γh if a relationship exists between node i and j
wi,j = 0 otherwise
with γ the decay constant and h the time passed since the transaction pursued,
measured according to the interval being studied (minutes for short term, hours
for medium term and days for long term). We set the decay constant γ such that
16
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the edge weight is close to zero after one month (long-term: γ = 0.0001), one
week (medium-term: γ = 0.004) and one day (short-term: γ = 0.03) respectively.
A high weight represents a recent transaction.
3.2.2. Network fraud propagation
Given a credit card network, how can we use the fraud label of the edges – i.e.
the transactions – to infer a score for each network object? That is, we want to
infer a score for each credit card holder, merchant and transaction. The derived
score expresses the extent to which the network object is exposed to fraud, and
is therefore called the exposure or suspiciousness score.
Influence propagation in networks is a widely researched topic, with many
good results in fraud detection (Akoglu et al., 2014, 2013; Pandit et al., 2007).
In earlier work, we proposed GOTCHA! ’s fraud propagation algorithm for social
security fraud to analyze bipartite graphs. GOTCHA! ’s propagation algorithm is
an iterative fraud scoring algorithm that is designed such that it scores two node
types (cfr. bipartite graphs) based on the label of one node type. Assume that a
graph consists of c type-one nodes and m type-two nodes. After k iterations, the
vector containing the exposure scores of each node equals:
~ξk = α ·Qnorm · ~ξk−1 + (1− α) · ~znorm (2)
with ~ξk the (c +m)-vector containing the exposure scores of each node after
k iterations, ~ξ0 a random vector with values between [0, 1], 1 − α the restart
probability (according to Page et al. (1999), we choose α = 0.85), Qnorm the
column-normalized weight matrix of size ((c + m) × (c + m)), and ~znorm the
normalized degree-adapted starting vector of size (c + m). Both Qnorm and
~znorm are weighted in time to address the dynamic characteristic of fraud.
Equation 2 starts from a limited set of labeled nodes to infer a score for the
remaining nodes. However, in the credit card fraud case, we require to start from a
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limited set of labeled edges to derive a score for both the edges and nodes. There-
fore, APATE ’s network propagation algorithm adapts Equation 2 by making two
changes: (1) Qnorm is transformed into a tripartite graph including transactions
as a node in the network; (2) ~znorm is a time-dependent normalized vector indi-
cating the fraudulent transactions. These adaptations are discussed next.
(1) Edge-to-node transformation
In order to be able to propagate influence from edges, we include the edges as
a separate entity in the network. That is, we transform the edges into nodes and
create a tripartite graph G = (V1,V2,V3, E) with E ⊆ (V1 ×V3)∪ (V2 ×V3), such
that the following property holds:
∀ v3 ∈ V3 : ∃! v1 ∈ V1 | e(v1, v3) ∈ E
& ∃! v2 ∈ V2 | e(v2, v3) ∈ E .
(3)
with v1 ∈ V1 the set of credit card holder nodes, v2 ∈ V2 the set of merchant
nodes and v3 ∈ V3 the set of transaction nodes. Property 3 enforces that credit
card holder nodes and merchant nodes can only be connected to transaction nodes.
We note that the edge weight in the tripartite graph between the transaction and
both the credit card holder and merchant is equal to the edge weight between the
credit card holder and the merchant in the original bipartite graph Wc×m. Let’s
say that c, m and t are the total number of credit card holder nodes, merchant
nodes and transaction nodes respectively, then the weighted matrix M(c+m)×t is
the mathematical representation of the tripartite graph which is exponentially
decayed over time (see Section 3.2.1).
As Equation 2 requires a symmetric matrix, we transform the tripartite graph
into a symmetric unipartite graph. Mathematically,
18
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Qtri =

 0(c+m)×(c+m) M
M ′ 0t×t

 (4)
Matrix Qtri is a matrix with c +m + t rows and columns. After normalizing
the columns such that each column sums up to 1, the resulting matrix is Qtri
norm
.
(2) Starting vector
The starting vector is originally created to personalize the ranking of web pages
by guiding the algorithm with the user’s interests (Page et al., 1999). Rather than
initializing the starting vector as a uniformly distributed vector, the starting vec-
tor can be used to emphasize the influence of certain nodes on the final ranking.
The same reasoning holds for fraud. As we are not interested in any influence
to propagate through the network, but only in fraudulent influence, we guide the
algorithm by specifying the confirmed fraudulent transactions using the starting
vector. That is, the starting vector ~z tri of size (c+m+ t) equals:


ztrii = e
−γh if node i is a fraudulent transaction
ztrii = 0 otherwise
with γ the decay constant, and h the time passed since the transaction is
labeled as fraudulent. Dependent on the time window of analysis, we exponentially
decay the fraudulent influence on long (γ = 0.0001), medium (γ = 0.004) or short
(γ = 0.03) term. All credit card holder and merchant nodes have a zero weight
for the starting vector. Remark that we assign a higher weight to fraudulent
transactions that occurred more recently.
The starting vector is normalized to ~z trinorm, summing up to 1.
Using the previous modification to the bipartite propagation algorithm as
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stated in Equation 2, we derive APATE ’s propagation algorithm for edge and
node labeling, where:
~ξk = α ·Q
tri
norm
· ~ξk−1 + (1− α) · ~z
tri
norm (5)
The resulting score ~ξk is computed using the power-iteration method, iterating
until convergence. Convergence is reached after a maximum number of iteration
steps or when the change in the scores is marginal.
3.2.3. Feature extraction
As we use a long-, medium- and short-term time window in the analysis,
matrix Qtri
norm
and ~z trinorm in Equation 5 are computed with different α values
(α = 0.0001, 0.004, 0.03) to infer an exposure score of each node and edge using
information up until one month, week and day respectively. For example, the long-
term exposure score indicates the extent to which the transaction (or merchant,
or credit card holder) is sensitive to fraud during the last month. In general,
the higher the exposure score of a network object, the more the node or edge is
surrounded by fraud in its neighborhood.
For each new incoming transaction, the following features are computed: (a)
credit card holder exposure score (CCHScore), (b) merchants exposure score (MC-
Score) and (c) transaction (TXScore) exposure score on long (LT), medium (MT)
and short (ST) term. We re-estimate the exposure scores for every network object
each day at midnight in order to extract the evidential features for transactions
that occur the next day.
The credit card holder and merchant exposure score are derived from Equa-
tion 5. If the credit card holder or merchant did not yet appear in the network –
i.e., he/she did not perform any transaction during the time period of analysis –
we assign a score of zero, as they are not yet exposed to fraudulent influences.
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The transaction exposure score combines the influence of the associated credit
card holder and merchant. If a transaction already occurred between the credit
card holder and the merchant, we use the exposure score as calculated in Equa-
tion 5. If multiple transactions occurred between the same credit card holder
and merchant, we use the score assigned to the most recent transaction. When
a transaction did not yet happen between a certain credit card holder and mer-
chant, we compute the exposure score of that transaction by using the exposure
scores of its direct neighborhood. Therefore, we say that we locally update the
exposure scores in the network, where:
TXNi,k,score =
1∑n
j=1wi,j + 1
CCHi,score +
1∑m
j=1wk,j + 1
MCk,score (6)
with TXNi,k,score the exposure score of a transaction between credit card
holder i and merchant k, CCHi,score the exposure score of credit card holder
i, MCk,score the exposure score of merchant k, wx,y the link weight between
node x and y, and n and m the total number of links from credit card holder i
and merchant k respectively. The local updating algorithm redivides the fraud-
ulent influences. Instead of propagating the exposure score of the credit card
holder/merchant only among the past transactions, the exposure score is now
partly absorbed by the newly added transaction. We note that the edge weight
of the new transaction is set to 1, as it represents a current relationship.
The network feature extraction step results in 9 features for each transaction:
long-, medium- and short-term exposure scores for the transaction, associated
credit card holder and merchant.
In the following section, we will estimate analytic models using three sets of
variables: intrinsic (18), network-based (9) and demographics (5); and measure
the capabilities they have for predicting fraud. In all cases, we seek to estimate
the probability of fraud given the variables available, that is:
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P (Y = fraud|XIntrinsic, XNetwork, XDemographics) (7)
4. Results
To test the proposed approach, a unique data set of approximately 3.3M trans-
actions from a large Belgian credit card issuer has been used. The data consists
of a supervised data set with all the information related to transactions occur-
ring during five consecutive weeks, plus a fraud or no fraud mark added for each
transaction by the company after suspicious transactions were investigated (after
two weeks at most). The data set is highly imbalanced, with only 48 000 frauds
among the transactions (< %1).
We test the approach seeking to answer three questions: What is the best
model for the approach? How can the model be applied in a real life-situation?
And finally, what is the added value of using network variables for this problem?
For all questions we will create an out-of-time test set consisting of all transactions
that occur in the last week (approximately 500k), while the first two weeks will
be used as the data pool for creating the RFM and network variables for the
following two weeks of data (the training set).
During data cleansing and pre-processing, all transactions that were rejected
due to normal banking reasons (wrong PIN, input errors, and other non-purchase
related reasons) were eliminated from the data set. These transactions account
for 15% of all transactions. Additionally, all transactions over 5000 EUR were
also dropped from the data set, to avoid distortions in the set. These transactions
are clear outliers: they consist of less than 1% of all transactions (none of them
fraudulent) and they were almost 25 standard deviations from regular transac-
tions, as shown in Table 1, so eliminating them leads to more stable models. The
final training set consists of 2.2M transactions, and the final test set consists of
500k transactions. For each case, the variables described in Section 3 are calcu-
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lated, accounting for 78 different variables, 9 which are network-based, 60 RFM
variables, and the remaining variables being the non-RFM literature variables, or
demographic and location-related.
4.1. Prediction Results
According to the findings of related research (see Section 2.3), we will bench-
mark three of them: logistic regression, the standard general linear model for
classification used in many banking related activities, which is the less powerful
of the group in terms of predictive capabilities, but is very simple to understand;
a feed-forward, one hidden layer, neural network, one of the most powerful non-
linear models, but that is considered a black box; and a random forest, a very
powerful ensemble of decision trees which has brought very good results in many
publications dealing with multiple applications.
To tackle the imbalance problem, we will apply standard case weighting for
neural networks and logistic regression. For random forests we will use the sub-
sampling capabilities of random forests, with each tree constructed using all fraud-
ulent transactions and a randomly selected subset of the non-fraudulent ones such
that they account for two times the number of fraudulent ones, as explained in
Chen et al. (2004). We used 500 trees for the random forest model, which gives
non-fraudulent cases an a priori chance of being selected similar to the one of
simple random sampling. For parameter tuning, in the case of neural networks,
20% of the training data set was reserved for tuning the parameters, selecting
the best combination of epochs and number of neurons over the grid given by
(Neurons,Epochs) ∈ [16, 156] × [100, 1000], with the epochs increased in incre-
ments of 50, and the neurons in increments of one.
The results, in Table 3, show a very high accuracy and Area-Under-the-ROC-
Curve (AUC) values. The models are almost perfect, correctly predicting 98.7%
of cases in the case of the random forest (the highest value), and with an AUC
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Table 3: Comparison of models
Model AUC Accuracy
Logistic Regression 0.972 95.92%
Neural Networks 0.974 93.84%
Random Forests 0.986 98.77%
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Random Forest: AUC = 0.986
Neural Network: AUC = 0.974
Logistic Regression: AUC = 0.972
Figure 4: ROC Curve for Different Models
of 0.987. The relatively lower accuracy in the other two models is caused by a
higher fraud detection rate when contrasted with false positives: the models are
good at detecting frauds, but that comes at a cost of some extra non-fraudulent
transactions being detected as fraudulent, which does not occur with random
forests. This hits accuracy given the high imbalance of the data set. The very
high AUC obtained can be seen in Figure 4.
To make a fairer comparison, possibly closer to a real application of the model,
we will study the case when at most a 1% false positives are acceptable. The
rationale behind this is that there is a reputational cost whenever a false positive
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occurs, given that users of the credit card will get a rejection on a non-fraudulent
transaction, with all the consequences and annoyances that such an action brings.
Table 4 shows the obtained results.
Table 4: Accuracy and AUC (test set) at 1% Maximum False Positive Rate
Model Cut-Off Balanced Acc. Specificity
Logistic Regression 0.85 87.4% 75.7%
Neural Networks 0.99 87.9% 76.8%
Random Forests 0.53 93.2% 87.4%
The results continue to be very good, but now the effects of the highly im-
balanced problem are apparent. Random forest is the best model overall, with
an 87.4% accuracy in the positive (fraudulent) cases, and a balanced accuracy of
93.2%. It is followed by neural networks, with a 76.8% specificity. The results
hint at a highly non-linear problem, since there is a clear advantage when using
non-linear models, which can be as large as the 12% increase in specificity when
comparing random forests with logistic regression. The difference between neural
networks and the random forest also suggests that the problem is not only highly
non-linear, but that it is necessary to apply an ensemble model that searches for
patterns in the sub-spaces that arise when applying a random forest. In any case,
the results are very good. A user could use the model and detect close to 90% of
all fraudulent transactions, flagging incorrectly only 1% of non-fraudulent ones.
4.2. Variable Importance and Network Variable Impact
The final question we would like to answer is which variables are more im-
portant, and try to measure their effect in the model overall. There are three
main sets of variables in the problem: The RFM and demographic variables, the
variables that are suggested in the literature that extend the RFM methodology,
and the network variables. In order to contrast these sets we will estimate three
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additional random forests – since they give the best results –, one for each subset
of variables. The results of these models can be seen in Table 5.
Table 5: AUC for Different Subsets of Variables.
Type AUC Accuracy
Only RFM 0.953 97.83%
Literature 0.955 97.87%
All Variables - First transaction 0.971 99.46%
Only Social Networks 0.920 94.37%
All variables 0.986 98.77%
It can be seen that only using the 9 network variables available the model
reaches an AUC of 0.920. A model with only the RFM and demographic variables
reaches an AUC 0.953, slightly higher. The inclusion of currency and country
variables, together with the transaction averages (from the literature) make the
AUC increase only slightly to 0.955. From these results we can conclude that
the RFM variables are a very good set of variables to predict fraud, permitting to
reach a very high AUC measure. The inclusion of the extended literature variables
increase only slightly the AUC from a pure RFM approach, which might be caused
due to regional behavior described in the data set we have available: variables
representing currency and country do not present a strictly different behavior in
Europe – with a unified currency, small travel distances and an integrated market,
which might be even stronger when considering online sales – than what it might
occur on different regions, such as North America or Australia. We can conclude
that the inclusion of transaction averages, currency, and country variables has a
minor, albeit positive, impact on the description of fraud for our data set.
The inclusion of social network variables in combination with all the RFM
variables has a very strong impact on the prediction results, reaching an AUC of
0.987. The main conclusion that we can derive from this result is that, considering
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Random Forest: AUC = 0.986
Only social variables: AUC = 0.92
Only RFM and demographic variables: AUC = 0.953
Only Literature (Extended RFM) variables: AUC = 0.955
Figure 5: ROC Curve for Different Subsets of Variables
that the social network variables have a very small correlation with respect to the
other sets (the largest is 0.1), the information that these variables bring allows
increasing the capabilities of the data set, interacting multidimensionally with the
other two sets of variables, which translates into an increase of 5% in the AUC of
the model. The ROC curves of the three different models (Figure 5) show that
the models perform similarly in terms of the separation of false positives and false
negatives, but the full model has less false positives in the early stages of the
model, and that gain comes from the combination of the data sets.
When dealing with fraud, it is common to see several transactions that occur
in a very short period of time, with a very high accumulated monetary value. As
such, detecting the first transaction that is fraudulent is an interesting problem.
In Table 5 we estimated the AUC of first transactions only (the ones with Glob-
alFrequencyHour equal to zero). It can be seen that the AUC, although lower,
is still very high, which suggests that the purchasing patterns that precede fraud
in the long term are the most relevant for predicting it, or, conversely, that it is
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Figure 6: Importance of each variable for the random forest built using all available
variables. In parentheses after each variable is the relevant information from the logistic
regression output: A + or - sign of significant coefficients, NS when the variable was not
significant, and C when it was highly correlated (greater than 0.9) with another variable
in the data set.
the contrast between the current and the past behaviors that allow to correctly
estimate fraud, and this is correctly captured by the variables in the model.
The exact relevance of the variable can also be extracted from the random
forest model, and sheds light on the multidimensional increase in predictive ca-
pabilities of the model. Figure 6 shows the relative importance of each variable
according to the random forest. It is interesting to note that the top two (with
very similar importance) are one for each set, and are both related to the mer-
chant at which the purchase occurs: AvgAmountMerchantWeek corresponds to
the average monetary value per week before the current transaction at the mer-
chant, so it shows the normal behavior on any given week, whereas LT TXScore
shows the long-term behavior of the network associated with the transaction it-
self, representing the normal, long-term, relation between merchants and the user
of the credit card, weighting in the expected patterns of both fraud and non-fraud
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given the structure of the network. The next set of variables are again some lit-
erature and RFM variables mixed with network variables, but now referring to
the medium-term (day) purchases, followed by the short-term network scores for
both the merchant and the transaction. The variables representing transactions
during the last hour seem to be of lower importance, and the currency variables
close the list, which suggest, as shown before, that the purchase pattern in Eu-
rope is marked by the euro, so effects on currency that were present in previous
works in the literature are annulled. It follows that it is from these relationships
between the social network variables and the purchase patterns that the learning
process is able to extract a significant amount of information that allows for a
very high accuracy and AUC. As was expected, the first purchase variables are of
limited importance in the random forest, but they can be significant in the logis-
tic regression, considering that we knew that the information of those variables
was included in a mixture of information from other variables which cannot be
recovered easily in generalized linear models.
Regarding the signs and significance, most short term variables are non-
significant in the logistic model, which suggests that the hourly behavior requires
a deeper multivariate analysis that random forests delivers. All currency-related,
and many country-related variables are highly correlated with other variables in
the data set which suggest that the purchasing patterns of the data set are highly
localized. The signs of the significant variables show that the hourly behavior
tends to have a positive sign, which increases the odds of fraud, showing that
when there are short-term increases in purchasing there is a higher risk of fraud.
Something similar happens with the global variables: a higher global frequency is
related to higher fraud, but a higher monetary value is related to lower odds of
fraud. All long term social network variables are relevant, with varying signs: the
long-term merchant score has a negative sign, showing that there are less risky
merchants when dealing with fraud, but the transaction and customer long term
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score has a positive sign, which suggests that there are riskier customers, more
prone to be subject to fraudulent activities.
5. Conclusions
In summary, this paper tackles credit card transaction fraud by proposing a
novel, automated and real-time approach APATE (short for: Anomaly Preven-
tion using Advanced Transaction Exploration). For each new incoming trans-
action, APATE decides whether the transaction might hint towards fraud and
whether or not it should be pursued. A major component of APATE is the fea-
ture extraction part, where we opt to combine both intrinsic and network-based
attributes. Our approach uses the RFM framework (Recency - Frequency - Mon-
etary Value) complemented with demographic information of the transaction to
define intrinsic features. As opposed to many previous studies, we enrich the de-
tection models with network variables. The credit card fraud network consists of
a network where credit card holders are connected to the merchants through the
transactions they make. In particular, this paper discusses a new technique for
fraud propagation through the network starting from a limited set of labeled edges
(i.e., fraudulent transactions) and inferring a score for all the network components
(i.e., credit card holders, merchants and transactions).
We tested the proposed approach on a company data set with more than three
million transactions, and estimated a logistic regression, a neural network and a
random forest model. Results show that our proposed approach leads to a very
high AUC score and accuracy, especially for the random forest model. Even after
adjusting the model to only allow 1% false positives, we obtain a high specificity,
meaning that our models efficiently identify fraudulent transactions. Although
each set of features separately results in a good model performance, the best re-
sults are reached when we combine both intrinsic and network variables, which
suggest that there is a multidimensional component that is inherent of the combi-
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nations of the RFM and network approaches, potentially capturing both a short
term change in behavior – contrasting the short term purchase pattern with the
normal ones, either daily or weekly one – and a long term structure of the trans-
actions, which arises from analyzing the different networks that can be inferred
from the data. Finally, we show that APATE is not only able to find almost
all fraudulent transactions, but also accurately pick out the first transaction in a
series of fraudulent transactions, which is an important requirement in curtailing
credit card transaction fraud.
While this work focuses on finding individual fraud, future work should inves-
tigate group behavior, i.e. the existence of fraudulent setups in the network of
credit card holders and merchants.
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